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Le concept d’inaliénabilité-marchande occupe une place centrale dans les sociétés
développées qui se sont dotées d’institutions de droit privé et qui s’en tiennent à une
conception classique du rôle de la politie dans la garantie, la gestion et la préservation de
ces institutions. L’inaliénabilité-marchande est une forme de non-marchandisation. Dans
l’optique de déterminer quelles choses ou quelles relations peuvent être traitées comme
des marchandises, je commence par critiquer une méthode d’analyse fondée sur une
conception traditionnelle du droit et de l’économie qui n’émet absolument aucune objection à
l’égard de la marchandisation. À contre-courant de ce mode de raisonnement, j’entreprends
d’examiner deux points de vue qui avancent que certains types de marchandisation sont
injustes. Estimant qu’aucune de ces théories critiques à l’égard de la marchandisation n’est
satisfaisante, je m’intéresse de près à l’exemple de la vente de bébés afin de montrer les
dilemmes posés par la marchandisation et la complexité des arguments à ce sujet. Je me
penche ensuite sur la pratique des contrats standardisés (ou « contrats types ») qui dérogent
systématiquement aux droits juridiques de base des personnes à qui ils s’appliquent. Le
recours aux contrats pour échapper aux droits fondamentaux revient à marchander certains
droits qui devraient pourtant être inaliénables. Ces droits devraient rester en permanence
sous la protection de la politie et ne devraient faire l’objet d’aucun commerce.
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THIS ARTICLE REFLECTS ON MY PATHS AS A RESEARCHER; first in property

law, and later in contract law. Each path led me to study the limits of these
aspects of private law. Each path led to the issue of market-inalienability in theory
and practice. In Part I, I consider the background limits of market-enabling
legal regimes. In Part II, I critique a traditional view of law and economics
that condones the commodification of anything whatsoever. Counter to this
mode of reasoning, I review two points of view that consider some kinds of
commodification wrongful: commodification as “desperate exchanges”1 and
1.

Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic
Books, 1983) at 102.
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commodification as “corruption.”2 Finding neither of these anti-commodification
theories satisfactory, I review in some detail the example of baby-selling—which
should more accurately be called purchased adoption—to show the dilemmas of
commodification and the complexity of arguments about it.
Juxtaposing these forms of commodification to a variety of commodification
that is more specifically thought of as contractual overreaching rather than
property overreaching, I turn my attention in Part III to the commercial practice
of deploying standardized fine-print contracts (“boilerplate”) that routinely
waive the background legal rights of those who receive them. This practice of
using contract to escape basic rights commodifies some rights that ought to
be market-inalienable. I argue that such rights should remain permanently in
the care of the polity, and should not be treated as objects of trade. In Part IV,
I consider the connection between the duties of the polity in this regard and
maintenance of the Rule of Law. Part V concludes.

I. MARKET-ENABLING LEGAL REGIMES AND THEIR
LIMITS
Markets depend upon an infrastructure of background rules or practices in
order to function. Markets require enabling regimes. In developed societies,
the background infrastructure consists primarily of the legal regimes of private
law. But even informal markets need rules of the game. Without rules of the
game, there may be anarchy, but not a functioning market. Those who argue that
certain market limits or regulations interfere with the “free” market I take to be
actually expressing a belief that the rules of the game of a particular market are
not the proper ones. It is incoherent to suppose that a market—a legal social (or
socio-legal) organized institution for trading entitlements—could be free of all
rules whatsoever.
The primary legal regimes of private law are property and contract, which
both govern the entitlements of, and transfer powers to, individuals or firms.
Tort also is a part of private law, because it underlies private remedies, and (in
traditional construals) is based upon individuals’ rights to be free of harm from
others when the behaviour causing the harm is negligent or worse. Each branch
of private law can be explained either on the basis of strictly individual rights,
or on the basis of maintaining civil society and legality as a whole. In this article,
I am concerned primarily with property and contract, their limits as between
2.

Michael Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (New York: Farrar,
Straus, and Giroux, 2012) at 46 [Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy].
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individuals or firms, and ultimately their relationship to the background state
and the preservation of civil society and the Rule of Law.
Property law tells us with whom rights to control a resource start out, and
contract tells us with whom those rights end up. I will often refer to “propertization”
rather than to “property” simpliciter, to signify that what counts as property
depends upon what a particular culture or state recognizes as property, and hence
to signify that what is considered property changes over time as well as from
place to place. Analogously, I will often refer to “contractualization” rather than
to “contract” simpliciter, to signify that what counts as an enforceable contract
varies over time and place.
Property and contract have limits. We often use certain symbolic examples
to characterize those limits. In philosophy the idea of such a limit has often been
characterized by considering selling oneself into slavery. If ownership of one person
by another is not permitted, that is a limit on propertization. If trading a person
to another is not permitted, that is a limit on contractualization. Another example
often used to characterize limits on both propertization and contractualization
is the sale of children. Baby-selling is disallowed—as many people tend to
think at first glance—both because babies are not to be considered as objects of
propertization, nor are they to be considered objects of contractualization to be
monetized and traded in markets.3 To come to the present real world, in the US
many employees and consumers routinely receive fine-print alleged “contracts”
that waive their background rights. This sort of fine-print mass-market rights
deletion is known as boilerplate. Boilerplate prima facie raises questions about the
limits of contractualization (are these lists of boilerplate terms properly considered
contracts?) and, at a deeper level, issues of propertization (are these background
rights appropriately considered property that individuals own and can dispose of
in this manner?). In my work, I have gone from baby-selling to boilerplate—that
is, from propertization to contractualization—but in both fields my overall focus
has been on the limits of these private-law legal infrastructures.4

3.
4.

Baby-selling—more accurately labeled purchased adoption—became a case of contested
commodification in recent years. See Part II(C), below, for further discussion on this topic.
See Margaret Jane Radin, Reinterpreting Property (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1993) [Radin, Reinterpreting Property] (essays on property, its rationales, and its limits);
Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,
1996) [Radin, Contested Commodities] (the limits of the market); Margaret Jane Radin,
Boilerplate (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013) [Radin, Boilerplate] (the limits of
rights deletion by means of fine-print alleged contracts).
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One way to focus on the limits of propertization and contractualization is
to focus on the lack of connection between rationales and practices. Let me call
this the issue of theory-to-world “fit” (or lack thereof ). To what extent must a
theory offered to justify a practice fit the facts in practice in order to be accepted
as a valid justification? I cannot answer this question in general terms. Instead,
I argue that whatever level of fit is necessary to consider a practice justified,
some practices can be seen not to rise to that level. If it seems that a particular
justificatory theory could not reasonably justify a particular practice in the world,
I call that a “disconnect” between the rationale and the practice.
A classical rationale for propertization is the idea that property is connected to
fostering or enabling personhood.5 A classical rationale for contractualization—
“freedom of contract”—is the idea that contract is connected to fostering or
enabling freedom.6 One can rely on Kant and Hegel for exegesis both of the
personhood rationale for property and the freedom rationale for contract.7
Ultimately, freedom and personhood are connected in these theories.
These classic rationales underlie our received justifications for the private
law institutions of the liberal state. It is true that these rationales have for some
time (especially in the US) been overtaken by utilitarian ideas, and have for
some time (especially among academics) been critiqued as liberal legalism.8
Below I will consider the position reached by a particular branch of utilitarian
thought. Yet the classic rationales based on personhood and freedom remain
significantly embedded in law, and in justification of the law in practice. All but
the staunchest utilitarians or critical theorists still rely on them. Legal actors in
practice ultimately rely on these classic rationales when they rely on the law as it
has been handed down to them.
In what ways do accepted rationales not fit our practices? Utilitarianism,
although widely prevalent in the US, does not fit well because it assumes
commensurability and with it commodification (more on this issue in Section
5.

6.
7.

8.

Radin, Reinterpreting Property, supra note 4. I took up this rationale in an early article and
reprinted it in this book, with a few corrections. See Margaret Jane Radin, “Property and
Personhood” (1982) 34:5 Stan L Rev 957 (see also the introductory essay in this book,
revisiting my earlier thoughts and replying to critics).
I offer a précis of various contract theories in Radin, Boilerplate, supra note 4 at 55-81.
Immanuel Kant, Moral Law: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated
by H J Paton (London; New York: Routledge, 1948); Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A V Miller (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass
Publishers, 1998).
See e.g. Wendy Brown & Janet Halley, eds, Left Liberalism/Left Critique (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2002).
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C of Part II, below). Second, the personhood justification does not fit well
because its deployment has been both overbroad and underinclusive in practice.
As an example of the former, consider the distinction between personal and fungible
property. When property is fungible it is used just like money; one property item
just as good as another of the same dollar value. As Bentham is supposed to have
said, “push-pin is as good as poetry.”9 The personhood justification should at least
prima facie apply only to a small subset of property rights in liberal society, not
to the vast range of rights that are fungible among actors for whom dollar value
is what matters. By contrast, when the personhood justification should apply,
because an item of property seems clearly personal to its holder, this connection
is sometimes just ignored. This is the widely held intuition about the famous case
in Oklahoma in which farmer land-owners agreed to allow strip mining on their
farm but bargained specifically for a clause promising that the company would
restore the land; instead the court changed this property rule into a liability rule
and gave the farmers only a pittance in money damages.10 These concerns give
rise to further questions: since one of the main indicia of fungible property is
tradeability for money and the concomitant commitment to monetary value,
under what circumstances might money valuation be disallowed and personal
property be transferable only by non-monetary transactions? In these cases,
attributing money value amounts to wrongful contractualization. Then what are
the limits of personal property? That is, what is wrongly propertized because it
should be considered an attribute of persons and not propertized at all? These
questions lead us to consider the issue of commodification.

9.

Bentham said, “Prejudice aside, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and
sciences of music and poetry.” See Jeremy Bentham, The Rationale of Reward (London:
J and HL Hunt, 1825) at 206. The popular misquotation originated with John Stuart Mill.
See John Stuart Mill, “Bentham,” in Dissertations and Discussions: Political, Philosophical,
and Historical: Reprinted Chiefly from the Edinburgh and Westminster Reviews, 2nd ed, vol 1
(London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 1867) at 389.
10. Peevyhouse v Garland Coal & Mining Co, 382 P (2d) 109 (Okl 1962). The terminology
“property rule” and “liability rule” stems from a law review article by Guido Calabresi
and A Douglas Melamed. A “property rule” means that owners have the power to decide
whether or not to sell their entitlements, and to determine the price if they decide to sell.
A “liability rule” means that another entity can divest the owner of the entitlement if it pays
compensation determined by itself, not the owner. Calabresi and Melamed were thinking of
forced divestment by courts and administrative agencies—for example, the power of eminent
domain. See Guido Calabresi & A Douglas Melamed, “Property Rules Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral” (1972) 85:6 Harv L Rev 1089 [Calabresi &
Melamed, “Property Rules, Liability Rules”].
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II. COMMODIFICATION AND THE LIMITS OF
PROPERTIZATION
Considering when contractualization and propertization are wrongful brings out
an important way to focus on the limits of propertization and contractualization,
namely, to consider their connection with commodification. A commodity is
something traded in markets for money or whose value is understood in terms
of money. Commodification, then, refers to the notion of treating something of
value in terms of market value, most often with the connotation that that thing
should not be so treated. As my research focused first on property and only later
on contract, I begin here with property.
A. MARKET RHETORIC AND OLD-SCHOOL CHICAGO

To launch this discussion, I will recall the characteristic discourse of
commodification, which I have called market rhetoric: In this discourse,
everything valuable is treated as genuinely, perspicuously characterizable in terms
of money and market exchange. Those who do not accept market rhetoric will
consider it a form of reductionism in which all values are reduced to market value.
But those who do accept market rhetoric will reply in market terms, saying that
I value more highly my discourse of different kinds of values. Those who espouse
market rhetoric are certain that we can and should analyze all human interactions
in terms of market exchange. We are to understand use of this discourse and its
reasoning as rationality. In a sense, market rhetoric has been the furthest reach of
the utilitarian understandings of personhood and agreement in the context of a
market society.
Let me recall some samples of market rhetoric and the discourse of
commodification. In his work, A Treatise on the Family, Gary Becker writes:
“the demand for children would depend on the relative price of children ... .
An increase in the price of children ... reduces the demand for children and
increases the demand for other commodities (if real income is held constant).”11
In Sex and Reason, Richard Posner notes: “A polygamist, or for that matter the
father of a girl, might tumble to the idea that a wife whose clitoris was removed
would require less supervision by her husband. Such women would become more
valuable in the marriage market. …”12

11. A Treatise on the Family, 2nd ed (London: Harvard University Press, 1992) at 138.
12. Sex and Reason (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992) at 214.
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As may be already clear, this market rhetoric discourse had its particular home
in what I call “old-school Chicago law and economics.” In spite of its location in
Chicago, it spread throughout American legal scholarship during the last part of
the twentieth century and perhaps the first decade of the twenty-first.13
The general background assumptions and conceptual commitments of old
school Chicago law and economics are as follows: the goal of society is thought of
in terms of welfare maximization (rather than human flourishing); government is
thought of in terms of paternalism (rather than polity); and all values are thought
of as commensurable and fungible, such that they can be arrayed on a scale and
traded off against one another. Those who accept this approach also share a
commitment to a particular conception of rationality, which holds that individuals
are rational in that they maximize their own welfare, defined only by themselves.
Individual rationality in this sense is combined with a broader methodological
individualism, which holds that only summation of individual preferences is
relevant for calculation of social welfare. Thus, there is no fundamental distinction
between individual decision making and democratic ordering, which is conceived
of as a congeries of individual maximizers cooperating for individual gain.14
In addition to these commitments to welfare maximization,
commensurability, fungibility, methodological individualism, and rationality,
several other tendencies seem to tag along with old-school Chicago commitments:
a certain Manichean view (a tendency to consider everything as separable into
two opposite poles or two opposing conceptual boxes); a certain Panglossian
status quo bias (a tendency to consider that whatever is, is right—i.e., efficient
and welfare-maximizing—at least presumptively); a certain foundationalism
(a tendency to consider that reasoning should proceed from certain defined or
root foundational premises such as efficiency, commensurability, methodological
individualism, and rationality); a certain collapse of the public into the private
(government regulation is justified, if at all, by finding a collective action problem
rather than thinking about the Rule of Law, the commitments of civil society,
or the functions that are inherent to polity); and a certain intuitive mapping

13. For my take on the premises and characteristics of “old-school Chicago,” see Margaret Jane
Radin, “Of Priors and Disconnects” (2014) 127 Harv L Rev F 259 (reply to review by
Michelle Boardman).
14. See e.g. Richard A Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 9th ed (New York: Wolters Kluwer
Law & Business, 2014); Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, 5th ed
(Boston: Pearson/Addison Wesley, 2011); Dennis C Mueller, Public Choice III, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003); James M Buchanan, Politics as Public Choice (Collected
Works of James M. Buchanan, The), vol 13 (Illinois: Liberty Fund, 2000).
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of these premises onto human behaviour (human choices are seen as “trades”
or “tradeoffs”).15
At the high point of the market rhetoric discourse that reflected these basic
assumptions, self-interested profit-maximizing was defined as “rationality.”
“Rational choice theory,” for example, referred to a theory dealing with how people
choose whatever will maximize achievement of the value they self-interestedly
pursue. This theory need not worry about the sale of children for adoption—
because everything about how we value children is already understandable in
terms of monetization. So Richard Posner, now a celebrated American judge,
probably did not think it was odd to publish an article in the 1970s suggesting a
market in the adoption of children.16
Along related lines, practitioners of economic political theory—also known
as positive political theory or public choice theory—are not worried about
turning democracy into a commodified enterprise, because in their analysis it
already is exactly that. We are to imagine a firm as asking itself the following
species of questions, to be decided by cost-effectiveness: “Shall we purchase
legislation in our favour?”; “Shall we purchase legislators (i.e., bribe them with
large donations)?”; “Shall we combine with other firms to impose our scheme?”;
“Shall we use onerous mass-market boilerplate—so-called adhesion contracts—
to withdraw background legal rights of consumers?”
Contemporary psychological insight into human decision making has
begun to undermine this view of human beings in terms of market rhetoric and
commodification. The field of behavioural economics—including behavioural
law and economics—is coming into maturity, and some former practitioners
of rational choice theory are in the process of reconsidering their foundational
commitment. Daniel Kahneman’s book, Thinking, Fast and Slow, recounting his
body of work with Amos Tversky, amounts to a renunciation of the “rational”
conception of human beings and their values in market rhetoric. As Kahneman
said, “To a psychologist, it is self-evident that people are neither fully rational nor
completely selfish.”17 The behavioural economist Richard Thaler characterizes
the distinction by calling the mythical person of economic theory an “Econ,”
whereas real humans are “Humans.”18
15. Radin, Contested Commodities, supra note 4 at 13.
16. Elisabeth M Landes & Richard A Posner, “The Economics of the Baby Shortage” (1978) 7 J
Legal Stud 323.
17. Thinking, Fast and Slow (Random House Canada, 2011) at 269.
18. See Richard H Thaler, Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics (New York:
W W Norton & Company, 2015). This conceit was popularized in the book Thaler
co-authored with Cass Sunstein. See Richard H Thaler & Cass R Sunstein, Nudge: Improving
Decisions and About Health, Wealth, and Happiness, rev ed (New York: Penguin, 2009).
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What is the difference between Humans and Econs? Econs are “rational.”
Econs are also radical commensuralists. They believe that all things of value can
be measured in one metric and can be traded off against one another to arrive at
the best sum of value. The Econ single metric has been dollar-value for the true
believers in old-school Chicago law and economics. Humans maintain a savings
account at 1% interest while carrying credit card debt at 8%. Econs—like an
accountant in the sky—zero out the balance sheet. Humans weigh possible losses
more heavily than hoped-for gains, whereas Econs treat these as the same. So,
Econs write off sunk costs, but Humans throw good money after bad.
Hilary Putnam, in his 1981 book, Reason, Truth, and History, offered a striking
parable regarding an imaginary group of humanoid “Super-Benthamites” and
how they differ from humans.19 This parable raises the issue of commodification:
How much (or how little) that characterizes humans and their choices can
be captured in the old-school Chicago type of thought? Further, might true
belief in this model, if implemented fully in life and society, undermine our
humanity? To raise the question about commodification it is now more succinct
to characterize it as a worry that pervasive commodification could turn Humans
into Econs. An old-style Chicago economics theorist—such as Becker or Posner
in the 70s and 80s—would say we have no worries because we are already Econs
(if these theorists thought we were not fully Econs, at least they must have thought
we were close enough to being Econs to make their theories worth considering).
Firms, too, are Econs. That is why these theorists tend to reduce the polity to a
congeries of individual Econs, and why they tend to consider political reasoning
and decision making as identical to cost-benefit analysis.
For those of us who do not accept the premises of old-school Chicago
economics (including, I believe, some writers who formerly were but no longer
are true believers), the question about the limits of commodification—and
therefore the limits of propertization and contractualization—becomes how to
differentiate convincingly between situations in which markets are appropriately
permitted from those in which they are not. This question has remained a puzzle.
We could phrase it as the monetization versus non-monetization of things,
people, attributes, groups, commitments—whatever we Humans value.

19. Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press, 1981) at 139-41.
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B. TWO STRANDS OF THOUGHT ON THE COMMODIFICATION PUZZLE

Rather than review the substantial literature on commodification and its limits,
I will recall here two important strands of thought.20 One of them, discussed
by Michael Walzer in his 1983 book, Spheres of Justice,21 can be aligned with
efforts to police contractualization for contracts that are not the result of free
choice. The other, advanced by Michael Sandel in his 1998 Tanner Lectures
and later popularized in his 2012 book,22 can be aligned with efforts to police
propertization to prevent treatment of certain things as commodities in markets.
1.

WALZER AND DESPERATE EXCHANGES

Walzer posits eleven separate spheres of justice, with the market as only one of
them (“the sphere of money and commodities”23). Walzer’s separation thesis is
that justice consists in complex equality, by which he means that the existence
of hierarchies in each sphere as a result of differences in biological endowments,
energy, and luck, is not wrong so long as preeminence in one realm does not spill
over, giving the top dogs in one realm automatic dominance in others. In other
words, justice consists in keeping the spheres separate. This thesis may seem to
imply that complete commodification in the market sphere is acceptable so long
as the market sphere is delineated properly.
Among the other spheres are education, free time, security, recognition,
public office, and political power. The question arises how to prevent money and
power in the market sphere from spilling over and giving those who dominate the
market unjust dominance in the other spheres? Walzer’s answer was that “the most
important principle has this (rough) form: the exercise of power belongs to the
sphere of politics, while what goes on in the market should at least approximate
an exchange between equals (a free exchange).”24
Walzer’s argument is unsatisfactory because his distinction between market
liberty and personal liberty assumes the divide Walzer wants the distinction to
20. For more literature, see Radin, Contested Commodities, supra note 4. See also Elizabeth
Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993);
Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
21. Walzer, supra note 1.
22. “What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets” (The Tanner Lectures on Human
Values, delivered at Brasenose College, Oxford, 11-12 May 1998), online: <tannerlectures.
utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/s/sandel100.pdf> [Sandel, Tanner Lectures]; Sandel, What
Money Can’t Buy, supra note 2.
23. Walzer, supra note 1 at 120.
24. Ibid at 120.
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delineate. Market liberty for Walzer characterizes the permissible domain of
commodification, and personal liberty characterizes a domain that is off limits to
the market. If we think that the kind of liberty to which an asserted transaction
belongs is intuitively obvious or a matter of definition—or a matter of superficial
conventionalism that we could determine by taking a survey—then we have
solved the normative issue of the limits of the sphere of money and commodities.
Otherwise, the categories of personal liberty and market liberty should be the
conclusions of a moral argument rather than the basis of one. (To be fair to
Walzer, I add that his main concern was to break down the issue of dominance
in the cultural, historical condition in which we find ourselves, not necessarily
to advance a method of solving such dilemmas. His intention was, it seems,
primarily to develop a sociological analysis, not a moral one.)
In any event, by using the metaphor of spheres, Walzer does not advance a
method of distinguishing between market liberty and personal liberty. It is unclear
whether the distinction between “free exchange” and “exercise of power” (or,
in Walzer’s term, “desperate exchanges”25) is useful in delineating the market
sphere. Does it mean we should allow only well-off people to sell their kidneys?
Does it mean we should declare that poor people cannot enter into enforceable
contracts? Such questions seem to be unanswered by resort to the metaphor of
spheres. Moreover, Walzer’s worst problem might be this: Even if we think of an
exchange as coerced and not usefully characterized as an exercise of liberty, we are
still left with the problem that, to desperate people, desperate exchanges must
have appeared better than their previous straits, and in banning the exchanges we
have not done anything about the straits. It seems to add insult to injury to ban
desperate exchanges by deeming them coerced by terrible circumstances, without
changing the circumstances.
2.

SANDEL AND CORRUPTION

In his Tanner Lectures of 1998, Michael Sandel distances himself from “the
argument from coercion”—that is, from those who think that commodification
(and privatization of public life) can be addressed simply by adjusting the
background conditions within which market trades operate.26 Sandel also
distances himself from the idea of fairness in background conditions,27 which
25. Ibid at 102.
26. Sandel, Tanner Lectures, supra note 22 at 94.
27. “The argument from corruption is intrinsic in the sense that it cannot be met by fixing
the background conditions within which market exchanges take place. It applies under
conditions of equality and inequality alike” (ibid at 95).
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he allies with the idea of consent, that is, properly implemented freedom of
contract. Here he parts company with the implications of Walzer’s argument.
Free and equal exchanges are not enough; that is, properly implemented
contractualization is not enough. “What that argument misses,” he writes, “are
the dimensions of life that lie beyond consent, in the moral and civic goods that
markets do not honor and money cannot buy.”28 So Sandel turns instead to the
concept of corruption. There are things that monetization corrupts, he says, and
we have to find out what things those are. I remain unclear about how exactly,
and on what principles, Sandel means to do that.29
I agree with the idea that more than free and equal contract (“fair exchange”)
is needed for a satisfactory understanding of the limits of commodification. But
Sandel’s argument against addressing background conditions seems to exclude a
significant pragmatic position allied with lack of fair terms of social cooperation.
If everyone’s choices to buy and sell were truly voluntary, it seems we would have
a lot fewer sales of babies, kidneys, and sexual services. Rich consenting people
are not observed selling their children or kidneys; they are observed buying the
children or kidneys of poor people. Rich consenting people are not observed
entering sex work; they are observed buying the sexual services of poor people.
This inequality raises the possibility that commodification is only worrisome to
us (if we are not old-school Chicago economics believers, who do not worry
about commodification) because the social conditions of trade are themselves
worrisome. It is not so easy to dismiss the issue of fair background conditions.
In a hypothetical world of complete freedom of choice, which is so far from our
own, can we even say anything about commodification? Perhaps an ideal complete
consent world would not use capitalist competitive markets. Full contractual
consent and fully free private ordering is ideological, not characteristic of any real
market society.
Also significant in my view is the fact that Sandel’s argument seems to skirt
the possibility that privatization of public life should be treated as a separate topic
from commodification in private markets. Excessive privatization of public life
means (in my formulation) removing to the private sphere aspects of social life,
control, and democratic ordering that belong to the polity only. Consider private
28. Ibid at 122. See also Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy, supra note 2 at 203 (“Do we want
a society where everything is up for sale? Or are there certain moral and civic goods that
markets do not honor and money cannot buy?”).
29. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy, supra note 2 at 46. “[W]e corrupt a good, an activity,
or a social practice whenever we treat it according to a lower norm than is appropriate to it.”
… A deal, even if not coercive, is corrupt when both parties “value the good being sold …
in the wrong way” (ibid).
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prisons, private police forces, private armies: such privatization of public functions
may seem to be instances of commodification but they also significantly threaten
the Rule of Law because they represent a degradation of democracy.30 Excessive
privatization is degrading or corrupting for democracy, but not in the same way
as commodification in individual transactions (though often they can occur
together). Excessive privatization degrades democracy because the background
safeguards of the polity are eliminated: private police, private armies, and private
prisons are not subject to constitutional limits on their power. They make more
profit when the situation for people in their purview gets worse, so they are
incentivized wrongly and in a way that undermines the democratic polity’s equal
concern and respect for its members.
How are we to decide when a type of transaction is corrupt, according to
Sandel? As Sandel recognizes, the argument that commodification corrupts or
degrades certain goods raises the difficulty that the argument from corruption has
to be made in a different way, case by case: “It must be shown how, in each case,
market valuation and exchange degrades or corrupts important values or ends
that non-market practices may embody.”31
Sandel also notes another difficulty with his view:
If we derive the fitting or proper way of regarding goods from the social meanings
that prevail in a given society at a given time, we run the risk of lapsing into
conventionalism. If, for example, there are fewer and fewer things that money
30. Margaret Jane Radin, “Boilerplate: A Threat to the Rule of Law?” in Lisa M Austin & Dennis
Klimchuk, eds, Private Law and the Rule of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014)
288 at 300 [Radin, “A Threat to the Rule of Law”]. Excessive privatization of the aspects of
democratic ordering that rely on the functional legal infrastructure presupposed by the idea
of commitment to the Rule of Law, such as access to courts and constitutional limitations
on the activities of police, results in a degradation of democratic ordering. In a functioning
democratic ordering, redress of grievances is available to all, and the activities of entities
such as police are subject to the same rules for the benefit of every one, and not dependent
on the “private” profits of the market. The closest Sandel comes to considering democratic
degradation in his book is this passage: “In addition to debating the meaning of this or that
good, we also need to ask a bigger question, about the kind of society in which we wish to
live. … At a time of rising inequality, the marketization of everything means that people of
affluence and people of modest means lead increasingly separate lives. … Democracy does
not require perfect equality, but it does require that citizens share a common life. … For
this is how we learn to negotiate and abide our differences, and how we come to care for the
common good” (Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy, supra note 2 at 202-03). I will come back to
democratic degradation and the Rule of Law in Part IV, below.
31. Sandel, Tanner Lectures, supra note 22 at 106. See also ibid at 104: “The argument from
corruption will be different in each case … the argument from corruption appeals to the
character of the particular good in question.” For further discussion, see Part II(D), below.

Radin, From Baby-selling to Boilerplate 353

cannot buy these days, we might simply conclude that the meaning of our social
practices is changing in this respect. … If, however, we derive the fitting or proper
way of regarding goods from some notion of the essential nature of the practices in
questions, we run the risk of essentialism—the idea that the purposes and ends of
social practices are fixed by nature.32

This is indeed a serious difficulty. Is it possible to argue that markets corrupt
or degrade certain goods, without lapsing into conventionalism or essentialism?
In my opinion, it is hard to do that without turning to a pragmatically inflected
Aristotelianism, which would try to hold to intrinsic values that characterize
human flourishing while yet taking account of situations in our ever-changing
various imperfect practices. Human flourishing is a deeply contested concept,
and I cannot see how it will ever be otherwise. Sandel would perhaps dispute
my inference about what he means by corruption by arguing that he does have a
conception of human flourishing, just one that is different from mine.
Nevertheless, in my opinion, Sandel does fall off the horns of the dilemma on
the side of conventionalism. He appeals again and again for us simply to see that
bribery and sale of places in line, and so forth, are corrupt. It seems to me that
unless we have an understanding of human flourishing to back up what we call
corruption, ultimately corruption is a conclusory label for something we dislike,
find distasteful, or abhor, given our current religious, social, and ethical culture.
Just who are “we”? The questions involving “our” conception of human
flourishing and how it reads on whether or not markets are permitted in specific
instances pose many difficulties. What counts as “our” in a multicultural society,
and in a world of other societies? Another question, and one that has interested
me in earlier work, is whether we can in some situations be Humans and Econs
simultaneously.33 It does not seem difficult for us to think of a precious heirloom
or a wedding ring as special and priceless “personal property” and yet have it
appraised for insurance like an ordinary commodity. But could we maintain an
organized market for adoption of children and yet maintain a non-commodified
conception of children? Some say yes and others say no.
C. BABY-SELLING: AN EXAMPLE

To see some of the complexities in thinking about commodification and the
limits of propertization and contractualization, consider the example of
selling adoption. Although this topic is usually brought up as sale of children,
32. Ibid at 106.
33. See Radin, Contested Commodities, supra note 4 (but in that book I had not yet come across
Thaler’s apt characterization of Humans versus Econs).
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it is actually narrower than the sale of children in general. Adoption, even if
commodified, seems prima facie different from selling children as prostitutes or
sex slaves or selling children to appear in pornographic films. So “baby-selling” is
too gross a term for the complicated problem of sale of adoption. Nevertheless,
I ask indulgence to keep referring to baby-selling, because at least it portrays the
passion with which partisans of different commitments view this general topic.
The fact that commodified adoption is a narrower category than baby-selling
brings up the troublesome question: What is the “good” that is the contested
commodity for analysis? I believe that this kind of question will always plague
Sandel’s arguments. He realizes that each “good” must be considered separately
in assessing corruption, but he does not tell us how we can define that “good.”
Even sale of adoption should—one can argue plausibly—be broken down for
analysis into sale of children already born and those yet to be born. Sale of those
yet to be born involves commissioned pregnancy—sale of children who are
conceived to order. One can also argue plausibly that commissioned adoption
should be further broken down by asking whether it matters if genetic material
is contributed by one or both purchasers. Is or is not the practice of surrogacy
merely a sub-category of commissioned adoption?
In previous work,34 I laid out the main arguments for and against baby-selling.
That exercise showed both that these arguments depend on definitions of the
“good” in question, and that they do not line up with entrenched fault lines
such as right and left or feminist and non-feminist. I think the exercise is worth
recapitulating, so Tables 1-3 summarize the three types of arguments used in
debates about the commodification of procreation or children. Each argument
type relies on a different primary animating value, and for each animating value,
there are arguments both for and against markets.

34. Margaret Jane Radin, “What, if Anything, Is Wrong with Baby Selling?” (1994-1995)
26:2 Pac LJ 135.
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TABLE 1: LIBERTY OF PERSONS IN A MARKET SOCIETY35
Basic
Value

Liberty of
persons in
a market
society

Branch

Market Proponents’
Argument

Market Opponents’
Argument

A. Various
Old-school Chicago
strands of
economists: Everything can be
libertarianism understood in market terms; no
markets should be foreclosed or
regulated unless there is some
kind of market failure.

Non-Chicago libertarians: Not
everything can be understood
in market terms; freedom of
the person is diminished, not
enhanced, if things “internal”
to the person are sold off, and
reproductive capacity is internal
in this sense.

B. Feminism

Feminist liberationists:
Women themselves, not the
government, should be able
to decide whether or not to
sell their children, just as
they should be free to decide
whether or not to terminate a
pregnancy.

Feminist historical critics:
Women’s freedom is not
enhanced by reinforcing their
image as breeders (or providers
of sexual and reproductive
services), in light of the long
and sad history of gender roles.

C. Results for
freedom in
practice

Pragmatic economists: If the
market is not allowed, there
will be a black market, which
will be (is) much worse. This
argument reflects an idea about
the irrepressibility of money
where there is desire—e.g.,
gambling, drugs, alcohol,
prostitution, and politics.
According to this argument,
the Econ in us is winning and
we should give up the fight.

Idealistic progressives: If a
legal market is allowed, we will
never be able to return to a
non-commodified conception
of children, and thereby of
ourselves. In the US, and
perhaps in other countries, the
Econ seems to be stronger in
our political leaders and their
decision making than it is for
the populace as a whole. It
is better to take steps now to
overcome this imbalance while
we still can.

35. The organization of these arguments into the format of tables was suggested by Stepan
Wood, the Editor-in-Chief of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal, and Tables 1, 2, and 3 were
designed by Mr. Wood, with the author’s approval and thanks.
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TABLE 2: PROCREATION AS AN ASPECT OF HUMAN AUTONOMY OR SELFHOOD
Basic Value
Procreation as a deep desire
or aspect of human autonomy
and self-hood (or human
partnership)

Market Proponents’
Argument

Market Opponents’
Argument

Those who are unfortunate
enough to be infertile should
be able to purchase what
they need for fulfillment of
their autonomy (and family
formation or communality).
There is no evidence that
these people will value their
children less as human beings.

The process of trying to
hand-craft children by
blending our genes with genes
of sellers whose looks, talents
(or race?) we like is dangerous
for humanity and human
society. We in the West attach
too much importance to our
genes. It would improve our
humanity and our society
if we adopted children
abandoned by others rather
than trying to hand-craft
birth children.

TABLE 3: SELF-CONSTITUTION AS A PERSON
Basic Value
Self-constitution as a person
(not as an object)

Market Proponents’
Argument

Market Opponents’
Argument

Adoptive parents who
purchased their children
love them and often have
rescued them from a difficult,
oppressive life, and more
objectified life. There is
no evidence that adopted
children, however acquired,
are treated in the aggregate
as more commodified or
objectified than those born in
the traditional way.

The sale and purchase of
children treats children as
objects (market commodities),
undermining the development
of a self-conception as a
unique person. The market
will likely differentiate
between “better quality” and
“worse quality” children by
features of the “product” (e.g.,
eye colour, potential athletic
ability, and the troublesome
factor of race). Moreover, the
sale of (some) children could
adversely affect personhood of
everyone (because we have all
been children) if all children
then conceive of themselves as
commodities and wonder how
much money they are worth.
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D. FURTHER COMMENTS ON CONTESTED COMMODITIES

Much has been written about baby-selling and other contested commodities, but
I am not attempting a review here. Instead, I will confine my further comments
to the two theorists I have mentioned.
Walzer seems to accept that freely contracted sales will not (at least prima
facie) be morally reprehensible—though he perhaps would not go as far as to
condone selling oneself into slavery with full cognizance and a range of other
choices.36 The difficulty with a topic like baby-selling is that it is messy in the
world: Many transactions are made between consenting adults, and many
others are made between powerful would-be parents and poor and desperate
birth parents. A detailed regulatory regime would be required to cope with
this complexity.
Sandel wants to avoid this complexity by somehow arriving at a moral answer
for each problematic “good.” He believes that he does not need to investigate
whether parties are doing trades with free choice on both sides, because the
notion of free choice is separate from the notion of corruption, so it is irrelevant
to his conclusion. Sandel’s procedure is somehow to determine which goods have
a moral value that would be (or is being) undermined by market trading. But all
of the conflicting arguments I lay out in Tables 1-3 rest on moral value, so it is
hard to arrive at any definite answer about which side should win. Moreover,
it is hard to get the argument off the ground because it is hard to define the
“good” in question. How would Sandel decide whether commissioned adoption
is a different “good” from sale of a live child? How would he decide whether
commissioned pregnancy and adoption with a contribution of genetic material
by the purchaser(s) is a different “good” than commissioned adoption without
that contribution?

36. Here we are led into the question of what constitutes coercion, because selling oneself into
slavery may not seem like a voluntary choice, except in theory. I cannot explore the topic
of coercion here, which, like many important philosophical topics, is deeply contested. The
view of coercion that I favour depends on to what extent one thinks that the circumstances
in which a choice is made render the choice coercive. In this view, coercion is present when
someone puts a party to a choice to which he or she has a moral right not to be put. “Your
money or your life” is a standard example. The victim is freely choosing to hand over his or
her wallet to save one’s life, yet many thinkers on the topic of coercion would say the victim
is coerced because he or she has a moral background right not to be put to that choice. This
theory is contentious, because one could posit that some situations we might call coercion are
not important enough to rise to the level of moral right, or even posit that some coercion is
morally justified.
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Sandel does not argue that all commodification is wrong. It is only wrong
where it represents corruption. Otherwise the market society is not questioned.
Sandel argues that whether on balance commodification represents corruption is
a moral question, to be approached differently in each case. In addition to the
difficulties I have already mentioned, this argument raises two questions: (1) how
much commodification in society is “too much”?; and (2) to what extent (if any)
is it an empirical question whether we have “too much” commodification in our
social practices?
With regard to question 2, I cannot see what kind of “empirical” question
that would be—I think it would not be answerable by taking a survey of
people’s beliefs. To see whether or not commodification of children, or some
other “good,” undermines self-constitution as a person, we need to know
whether a commodified (objectified) self-conception can stably co-exist with
a non-commodified (non-objectified) self-conception. Everything about the
bodies of models and actors is commodified and translates into more or fewer
dollars. Does this make them less of a person? It does enrich cosmetic surgeons;
it encourages some medical students to go into that field instead of family
medicine or gerontology. It does extend to high school graduation gifts of breast
implants or nose jobs. Yet it seems a stretch to say that the customers of this
industry are no longer persons.
With regard to question 1, what if we can both know the price (dollar value)
of something and also know that the thing is priceless? What if commodified
understandings of certain interactions can coexist with non-commodified
understandings? I think of this situation as incomplete commodification.
If incomplete commodification is stable and not always in danger of becoming
complete commodification, it might be acceptably human. Incomplete
commodification might mean talking Econ talk, for example, but not actually
buying and selling contested commodities. That approach might have been
true of Becker and Posner, though Posner did seem serious about setting up an
adoption market. If the level of this kind of incompleteness in commodification
is very robust, then we need not worry about turning into Econs. We will just
have an Econ part of ourselves but it will not capture the whole.
Yet one may wonder why market understandings have seemed so powerful?
Someone fully committed to the old-school Chicago view of rationality might say
market understandings are powerful because they are correct: They best explain
and order our world. Someone committed to Marxist critique might say that
market understandings seem powerful because they “naturally” link up with the
entrenched power structure of capitalism. Someone else might say that market
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understandings really do not seem so powerful now as they did in the 70s and
80s, and we do not have to worry. Still another might say, market understandings
have largely won out now. Our society is more marketized than ever but we
should not worry because there is nothing we can do about it.
Which view is right? I left this question unanswered in my earlier research.37
It troubled me that many feminists were choosing the market prong of a
dilemma—i.e. “I should be free to sell my baby for adoption if I want to”38—
without realizing even that there is a dilemma, though the dilemma is clearly
shown in the opposing arguments I mentioned earlier. I remain committed to
the idea that it is best to address these questions as dilemmas and try to see
how they might be resolved. I remain committed to the idea that attempting to
observe something that can be labelled “corruption” (or “freedom”) in a particular
practice is largely a dead end because the dilemmas remain.

III. BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF
CONTRACTUALIZATION
Now I want to turn from baby-selling to boilerplate. Here I offer some thoughts
on contractualization as it exists in the US today. I hasten to say that the
situation in the US I describe does not prevail to the same extent in any other
developed country. The progression of thought follows the pattern of reflection
on propertization. Thinking about the limits of propertization led me, first,
to examine how the basic rationale(s) for propertization do not read well on actual
practices in the world, and then to consider the problem of commodification
and the limits of markets (market-inalienability). Similarly, thinking about the
limits on contractualization led me, first, to examine how the basic rationales
for contract enforcement do not read well on actual practices in the world, and
then to consider the problem of commodification and the limits of markets
(market-inalienability). Market-inalienability is, after all, simply a prohibition
on contracting with regard to certain goods or attributes, even with full consent.
It is both a limit on propertization and a limit on contractualization, depending
37. See Radin, Contested Commodities, supra note 4, ch 7. These questions emerged more
clearly as I thought further about the dilemmas of commodification in the contemporary
world of gene technology and globalism. See Margaret Jane Radin, “Response: Persistent
Perplexities” (2001) 11:3 Kennedy Inst of Ethics J 305; Margaret Jane Radin, “Cloning and
Commodification” (2002) 53:5 Hastings L J 1123.
38. See e.g. Martha Ertman, “The Upside of Baby Markets” in Michele Bratcher Goodwin,
ed, Baby Markets: Money and the New Politics of Creating Families (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2010) 23.
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on whether we focus on prohibition of selling something or prohibition on
treating that thing as property.
A. A PROBLEM IN THEORY-TO-WORLD FIT

Standardized contracts—I should say “alleged contracts”—are causing a
disconnect between the rationale for contract enforcement and how these
contracts actually function in the world. This fissure in theory-to-world fit has
burgeoned in the contemporary world of the digital networked environment and
in the information society that this environment is creating.39 Before launching
into this discussion, I must make clear that I am not addressing all standardized
agreements or clauses. Standardized clauses or whole standardized agreements
are often very useful and can be the result of bargaining to agreement about
possessions that are in fact subject to private agreement.
Nevertheless, mass-market boilerplate, at least in the US, raises a question
about the limits of contractualization because it has become an ever-increasing
tool for massive rights deletion. By rights deletion, I mean clauses such as: waiver
of the right to sue for negligence (exculpatory or exclusion clauses); waiver of the
right to jury trial and aggregative relief (accomplished by mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses); and onerous forum selection clauses (undermining due
process of law by declaring that legal remedies must be pursued in a jurisdiction
far away from the injured party’s home).
The basic facts about contractual ordering are fundamental to western
systems of law and to civil society. In this fundamental understanding there
are four entrenched basic premises: First, with few exceptions we accept that
individuals ought to be able to express and enhance their autonomy to improve
their situations in life, by trading with others on terms acceptable to themselves
(some exceptions come to light when we consider market-inalienability in the
context of propertization). Second, we realize that, in order for this system to
work, human beings must follow through and keep valid contracts once made.
Third, we realize that, given our human fallibilities, some contracts will be invalid
for various reasons, such as coercion and deception; and some valid contracts will
not be performed. Fourth, we therefore entrust to the state the power and duty
both to police contracts for invalidity and to enforce performance (or grant the
injured party damages as a substitute) where a party fails to perform a contract

39. I addressed the issue of theory-to-world fit in Margaret Jane Radin, “The Deformation
of Contract in the Information Society,” (2017) Oxf J Leg Stud gqx001 [Radin,
“Deformation of Contract”].
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that is valid. The state must refuse to enforce invalid contracts and it must enforce
valid contracts.
When the state enforces a contract made by A and B, the state deprives A of an
entitlement, something that legally belonged to her, and delivers that entitlement
to B. What prevents this from being an unjustified state redistribution of property
rights? Thus, the question becomes: what acceptable theory (or theories) justifies
the state in deciding when A and B have entered into a contract and when they
have not; and when either A or B has breached a contract and when he or she
has not? Contract theory is crucial to the legitimacy of contractual enforcement.
Basic contract theory has several branches: autonomy (freedom) theory,
utilitarian theory, Aristotelian theory, and economic theory (a branch of
utilitarian theory).40 Each of these theories has at its root the assumption that
people exercise freedom of choice when they enter into agreements (which the
state will then enforce). Each of these theories also assumes that individuals are
free and equal; and that individuals make choices for their own lives, and are not
subjugated to others. How, if at all, do these theories of justification map onto
our current practices of contractualization?
All prevalent theories require agreement.41 Two parties agree on an exchange.
What does it take to bring about agreement? This is a disputed question, which
I cannot elaborate here. Instead I will approach the issue from the other end:
at least it is not hard to specify some varieties of circumstances that do not bring
about agreement. Although a general theory of what constitutes agreement is not
self-evident, without going into philosophical dilemmas and disputed premises,
I think we can postulate that a person cannot be said to have agreed to something
unless he or she at minimum—before agreement!—possesses a certain quantum
of information about what he or she is agreeing to, and unless we can determine
that he or she was not coerced or deceived.

40. See Radin, Boilerplate, supra note 4 at 55-72. There I offer a summary of the main theories of
contract. I hope that chapter will prove useful for students of the law.
41. A number of prevalent theories base contract on promising rather than on agreement: two
parties come together and promise each other to perform. See e.g. Charles Fried, Contract
as Promise, 2nd ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). There are debates in the
philosophy of contract about whether one should take promising or agreement as basic. See
e.g. Gregory Klass, George Letsas & Prince Saprai, eds, Philosophical Foundations of Contract
Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). I do not mean to equate promising fully
with agreement, but I think that theories based on promising tend to assume agreement as
a background condition. Even if promise theorists would disagree with this, at any rate I
think that relating the basis of contract to agreement does not lead to results that are not also
reached by promise theorists, given similar intuitions about substantive outcomes.
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Yet when we come to the realm of contract law as it is practiced in the
US with regard to “contracts of adhesion,” some things seemed to be dubbed
agreement just in order to be able to call a situation an enforceable contract.
A free individual cannot validly be said to agree to have his or her freedom of
choice engaged by the mere fact that a list of terms exists somewhere in his or her
physical vicinity. Yet American law tends to the position that if someone had a
reasonable opportunity to see a list of terms, that person is bound to those terms
even if he or she did not actually see them. Nor can a free individual validly be
said to agree to have his or her property or freedom of choice curtailed by a list
of waivers that is revealed later, after he or she has already agreed to an exchange
without seeing the rights deletion list. Yet US courts enforce pay-now-terms-later
(PNTL) procedure as being contractual—the customer pays first, the merchant
deposits the money and ships the goods, then boilerplate terms arrive with the
goods. Helping convince courts to validate this procedure is a rather useless
proviso that if recipients do not like the terms when they arrive, they may send
back the product and get their money back.
I hasten to say that in the common law there is an “objective” theory of
contract that does not require actual agreement, but only a situation that looks
like agreement. This doctrine has been with us—that is, with jurisdictions that
received the law of England—since the inception of the industrial era. It says
that one party will be deemed to have accepted (agreed to) the proposal of the
other party when the proposing party could reasonably believe that agreement
to his or her offer was being signaled; that is, where behaviour of the offeree
could be understood to have looked to the offeror like agreement. This theory
probably functioned acceptably when all who entered into contracts were traders
who knew each other, who were socialized into a particular practice in which it
was feasible to know when agreement was being signaled. In today’s world, this
“objective” doctrine reveals a fissure in contract law—we say that real agreement
is necessary to deprive someone of an entitlement, yet we also say that it is good
enough if circumstances somehow look like real agreement happened.
Even though this “objective” doctrine survives, companies that deploy
mass-market boilerplate designed specifically to conceal such things as overdraft
fees and balloon payments should not be allowed to claim that they reasonably
believe the recipients are actually agreeing. Moreover, the procedures such as
reasonable opportunity to see a list of terms—or PNTL—that are today called
agreement, are often problematic even under objective theory. If the state enforces
such alleged agreements anyway, it takes property (money or other rights) from A
and delivers it to B without justification, unless we find a better rationale—better
theory-to-world fit—to justify such enforcement.
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B. OTHER APPROACHES TO EVALUATION OF BOILERPLATE
ENFORCEABILITY

What better rationales might there be? It is not convincing to change the meaning
of the word “agreement” by fiat (at least in the short run, though language is
malleable in the longer run). Yet it does look as though US courts and boilerplate
defenders are doing just that. Such devolution in the meaning of agreement is
what I call normative degradation.42 Normative degradation would be Humpty
Dumpty’s solution: “‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather
scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.’”43
Nor do I think it is acceptable to say that a rational person would agree to this
set of unread fine print rights deletions, even if this particular person did not.44
A favourite substitute rationale for boilerplate enforcement, endorsed by
many, can be paraphrased as “But–in our modern market society—we really need
to have enforceable mass-market boilerplate!”45 It may turn out that need for
enforceable mass-market standardized fine print turns out to be a good substitute
rationale for enforcement in some instances. But that does not tell us that we
should keep calling mass-market rights deletions contracts. The contractual
rationale for taking a property right from A and giving it to B that currently exists
in our system of government is actual (uncoerced and non-deceptive) agreement
(with an asterisk for something that looks as if agreement took place). To justify
proceeding under the substitute rationale of our need to defend mass-market
boilerplate, it seems we need to find a legal niche other than contract.
Let us suppose we really do need to allow private firms to instigate and deploy
some types of mass-market rights alterations in order to have efficient procedures
for everyday transactions. Standardization does seem important (and perhaps
indispensable) in many arenas. Standardized clauses or complete standardized
sets of terms can be used for actual agreement. This method of agreement does
not raise a concern about calling such a deal a contract.
Yet the argument that we need boilerplate—standardization of terms—
cannot mean that we need to make each and every clause that firms dream up for
their own advantage enforceable. We have to have some means of separating the
sheep from the goats—just as we do when dealing with individually negotiated
42. See Radin, Boilerplate, supra note 4 at 19-32.
43. Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There (New York: Random
House, 1965) at 94.
44. I will come back to this argument later. See further discussion at Part III(C), below.
45. See e.g. Brian H Bix, “Contracts,” in Franklin G Miller & Alan Wertheimer, eds, The Ethics of
Consent (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) 251.
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contracts. Standardization is desirable when it is used for effecting transactions
that benefit individuals and society; standardization is not desirable when it is
imposed by firms to privatize an infrastructure of law that ought to remain public.
So, in the cases where mass-market boilerplate is deployed but the meaning
of agreement seems at best distorted, we would need to seek other legal means
by which mass-market boilerplate might be regulated. Some boilerplate could
be acceptable even without calling on the concept of agreement, but some
should be disallowed—particularly deceptive boilerplate that deprives a person
of basic legal rights.
Such deceptive boilerplate could be assimilated to torts protecting persons
from fraud and deception. If a firm is shown to have used terms on purpose to
deceive people, or to take advantage of people’s known heuristic biases (such as
the belief that we will never miss a payment or have an overdraft),46 that firm
should not be heard to claim that they believed recipients to be actually agreeing
(the objective theory of contract should have no weight in such cases). It is not
radical to switch legal adjudication of consumer claims against mass-market
rights deletions from contract law to tort law. Over time legal doctrinal categories
change. Warranty passed from contract to tort, for example. Tort also gathered up
a lot of causes of action in the past, such as the law of master and servant. Tort may
be a helpful way to judge the limits of enforceability of mass-market boilerplate.
Further, we could allow some level of boilerplate that we deemed not deceptive
to be treated simply as part of the product being purchased. Here I partially
agree with a certain type of economic theory put forward by Douglas Baird.47
He posits that both the boilerplate and the functional mechanisms of a product
can be considered internal to the product, and will together determine its market
price. I only partially agree with Baird, because not all markets will result in an
appropriate price being set for all buyers. That depends, among other things,
on whether the market can be segmented, and on the degree of information
asymmetry between sellers and buyers and among buyers.48 Moreover, I only
partially agree because some of those terms that are part of the product may be
attempting to delete market-inalienable rights, as I will discuss shortly.

46. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics, and Psychology in Consumer
Markets (Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 8-17.
47. “The Boilerplate Puzzle” (2006) 104:5 Mich L Rev 933, reprinted in Omri Ben-Shahr,
ed, Boilerplate: The Foundation of Market Contracts (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2007) 131. See also Douglas G Baird, Reconstructing Contracts (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2013) ch 8 at 123-46.
48. See the text accompanying notes 60-61.
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Even if terms-plus-functioning parts are one product, there is still such a
thing as a defective product. So, this contract-as-product theory, which should
now be called “composite product theory,” is another way to lead us toward a
tort-like theory of adjudicating the enforceability of boilerplate.
Even if the firm does not insist very strenuously that its fine print is a contract,
its fine print can still make its product defective. Consider Facebook’s Data Policy:
We store data for as long as it is necessary to provide products and services to you
and others … . When you delete your account, we delete things you have posted
… . Keep in mind that information that others have shared about you is not part of
your account and will not be deleted.49

Facebook has gradually broadened its terms over time. Now many people
have grown up with their entire lives on Facebook. They cannot delete their
accounts without losing special memories. And even if they do delete their
accounts, Facebook retains the right to market products to others using content
that was shared. Facebook’s terms are a good candidate to be seen as rendering
Facebook a defective product.
In addition to considering tort-like limits on mass-market boilerplate
deletions of recipients’ legal rights, we should pay renewed attention to due
process of law as another means of developing appropriate limits on suppression
of the right to redress of grievances. In this regard, the work of Judith Resnik,
a scholar of due process and procedural constitutional law, should be noted.50
Resnik recently analyzed the US Supreme Court’s cases that re-interpreted the
1925 United States Federal Arbitration Act51 to give it ever wider applicability. She
concluded that although this expansion has encouraged the “mass production of
arbitration clauses” by firms that deploy these clauses in boilerplate with millions
of consumers and employees, consumers and employees enter into arbitration
extremely rarely.52 Resnik concludes that the Court’s attempt to replace public
dispute resolution (litigation) with private dispute resolution (arbitration) instead
most frequently results in no dispute resolution.
What is wrong with using arbitration in consumer disputes? It is supposed
to be cheaper and quicker—that is why companies like it. And, in theory, that is
why consumers should like it, too. But (1) many arbitrators are repeat players for
49. Facebook, “Data Policy” (29 September 2016), online: <www.facebook.com/
full_data_use_policy>.
50. “Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the
Erasure of Rights” (2015) 124:8 Yale LJ 2804.
51. 9 USC §§ 1–16, 43 Stat 883.
52. Resnik, supra note 50 at 2812.
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firms, and it is at least widely suspected that they rule in favour of the firm most
of the time;53 (2) arbitration is private and secret, so if a firm were to lose a case of
attempted waiver of rights to one consumer, it could still deploy the same waiver
with every other consumer; (3) arbitration creates no precedent, so that even if
consumer A wins an arbitration case and succeeds in disallowing a waiver, the
firm can still deploy the same arbitration clause against consumers B through Z;
and (4) as interpreted by the US Supreme Court, arbitration must be strictly by
an individual against the firm, so aggregative actions are prohibited. That means
that many injuries—those that depend on aggregative actions—simply cannot be
remedied. The US Supreme Court in effect has said that this is just too bad.54 No
wonder arbitration is rarely used by consumers and employees.55
In addition to urging courts to pay better attention to due process of
law, we could consider taking this issue away from the courts, and regulating
boilerplate similar to food labeling. We do not allow food purveyors simply to
paste a label on a package saying that if it causes purchasers or their children to
get sick, that is just too bad—the firm is not responsible. So why should we allow
a nursing home or a daycare centre to exclude itself from liability for any and all
harm it causes to our parents or our children? Yet many service providers deploy
blanket clauses that exclude liability for all harms to patients or customers.56
53. See David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, “After the Revolution: An Empirical
Study of Consumer Arbitration” (2015) 104:57 Geo LJ 57 at 124 (disputing earlier research
claiming arbitrators are employed by firms and biased in their favour, but concluding that
“high-level and super repeat-playing companies perform particularly well”). See also Resnik,
supra note 50 at 2853 (describing how arbitration organizations are structured so that it is
impossible for us to know and observe what they and their members are doing).
54. See American Express Co v Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S Ct 2304 (2013),
Kagan J, dissenting.
55. See Resnik, supra note 50. Note that I am considering here only arbitration clauses in
mass-market deployments by firms with employees, consumers, and businesses in the
position of consumers. International arbitration and arbitration between large firms of
roughly equal negotiating power form a different subject. Arguably, it was these latter
arbitrations that the US Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 was intended to serve, and not the
wholesale use of arbitration to narrow or eliminate consumer remedies that the US Supreme
Court has now interpreted that statute to cover.
56. Note that this rampant exculpation that is taking place in the US through boilerplate
deployment relates to service providers not products. In the US, contracts for the sale of
goods are covered by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), a model statute that every
state has enacted (with some differences). The UCC provides that purported contractual
exculpation for a seller’s own negligence is prima facie unconscionable if it causes injury to
a consumer, but there is no comparable law for services. See UCC § 2-719 (2002). I must
also note here, as many readers will be aware, that such exculpatory or exclusion clauses in
consumer transactions are illegal in many countries.
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Added to the almost ubiquitous pre-dispute arbitration clauses that effectively
waive class action rights, it seems that recipients are widely deprived of redress of
grievances. Perhaps this is a cause for the polity itself to reestablish its unwaivable
responsibility to provide for redress of grievances.57
C. CODA: FLAWED ARGUMENTS IN DEFENCE OF BOILERPLATE

This discussion would be incomplete, I fear, without responding to various
defences for boilerplate endorsed by businesses and their supporters among
law-and-economics writers. Although these arguments may explain why
standardization of terms is often appropriate, I think they fail to justify
mass-market boilerplate rights deletions across the board. Economics is supposed
to evaluate markets one at a time, not make blanket assumptions. I have alluded
earlier to some of these defences, but I will conclude this discussion by offering
more about these defences of boilerplate rights deletions, dividing them into
empirical and normative arguments.
The most common empirical argument runs as follows. Exculpatory clauses,
forum selection clauses, and other rights deletions will allow the firm to save
money. The firm will pass on these savings to consumers in lower prices.58
Consumers will value the lower prices more than they value their legal rights.
To put this slightly more accurately, consumers will not value their legal rights
at or above the difference between the price of the product or service with
legal rights included versus the price without legal rights included. Therefore,
boilerplate defenders say, the deprivations are efficient and justified.
What is wrong with this argument? It is probably true that the firm will save
money for itself by depriving consumers of their legal rights (unless doing so
starts to drive customers away, which it may well do when a large enough cohort
of customers becomes aware of the practice). But it is not necessarily true that
57. As I write this, the US’s Consumer Financial Protection Board (CFBC) is considering
rules that would curtain arbitration clauses used against consumers and employees. See
Consumer Financial Protection Board, “CFPB Proposes Prohibiting Mandatory Arbitration
Clauses that Deny Groups of Consumers their Day in Court” (May 2016), online: <www.
consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-proposesprohibiting-mandatory-arbitration-clauses-deny-groups-consumers-their-day-court>.
The CPFB’s position is politically precarious, however, because the current government is
dominated by conservatives; the CPFB may lose its power to regulate arbitration clauses,
or even be legislated out of existence.
58. Carnival Cruise Lines v Shute, 499 US 585 (1991) at para 594. This argument is said to
“stand to reason,” with absolutely no documentation or reasoning whatsoever. Unfortunately,
US federal courts have not only followed but rather expanded on the holding of this case. See
e.g. ProCD v Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir 1996).
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the firm will pass on its savings and charge customers that much less. Instead,
the firm may just keep the money. Whether or how much savings and charges
(such as taxes) are passed on is a difficult topic in economics. At least whether
or not passing on occurs, and to what degree, depends upon various factors that
differ with each market—whether or not the market is competitive, whether
or not there are close substitutes for the product, and particularly the degree of
understanding or information possessed by buyers of the product. Therefore,
at minimum, this argument must be evaluated market by market, and cannot
be valid as a general matter. Contrary to the US Supreme Court, it cannot just
“stand to reason.”59
Moreover, it is not appropriate to consider consumers’ low ex ante subjective
valuation of their legal rights as the proper amount to trade off against the
supposed lower prices to be offered by the firm. As I argued in Part III(B) above,
legal rights of redress are not salient to individuals before they are needed. The
fact that many consumers do not subjectively place much value on their legal
rights before a situation arises in which the rights are needed does not mean that
the legal rights are not valuable to each and every consumer. It is not true that we
must subjectively understand and monetarily value legal rights for those rights to
be valuable to us as individuals. To think that idea is valid reflects a naïve embrace
of old-school Chicago law and economics.
A more sophisticated variant of the blanket empirical argument is the idea
that the service or physical product should be combined with the boilerplate
and treated as one object, which I discussed earlier as the composite product
theory. The argument here is that even if most consumers do not know what
is going on with the boilerplate and therefore do not know to what extent they
value their legal rights, there will be some subset of consumers who are “savvy”
about this—who have enough information to know what value to attach to the
service or physical product itself, combined with what value to attach to the
rights that come with it. This theory, in other words, divides consumers into
a large component of low-information consumers and a small component
of high-information consumers. The “savvy” subset will set the market price,
and all the other “non-savvy” consumers will be able to take advantage of the
same price (assuming, of course, that the seller cannot segment the market to
charge more to the non-savvy people). Law-and-economics scholars who follow
the savvy-subset theory indeed say that the non-savvy people are benefiting
from cross-subsidization on account of the savvy people—that is, that they are
benefiting from the information known by others.
59. Carnival Cruise, ibid.
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There are several difficulties with this savvy consumer subset theory,
owing to the fact that economics is considered an empirical social science. The
argument is not generalizable. We cannot assume that each and every market—or
a subset large enough to validate the argument (whatever that would be)—is
competitive. We cannot assume that each and every market has the proper
amount of knowledge in the proper number of consumers and the proper level
of difficulty of market-segmentation.60 Even in a competitive market, if all
recipients have low information about product quality (and here product quality
includes accompanying legal rights), then the market can result in a “lemons
equilibrium”61—that is, a race to the bottom. To stay competitive, all firms will
have to offer their worst contract and the recipients will not know that the better
contract would be more valuable to them.
Turning to normative difficulties with these attempts to defend mass-market
rights deletions, let us assume that people mean to sell off their legal rights for
lower prices, and let us even assume that the prices would actually be lower.
If people can routinely sell off their legal rights, that establishes a market in legal
rights. It is true that many legal rights are saleable in markets: fungible property
rights and individual labour (subject to regulation that establishes limits). But,
as I will consider briefly below, basic legal rights—those that we hold as members
of a civil society—should not be treated as routine commodities. That is, they
are market-inalienable, at least in situations where deletions are attempted on a
mass-market basis.
The vast majority of people cannot subjectively value legal rights before
they need them. Human judgment is inherently faulty in this respect. So, what
if people might routinely sell off their legal rights because they are unable to
realize their value subjectively before something bad happens and they need those
rights? Prevention of this kind of result can be characterized as a reason why we
(in the traditional metaphor) exit the state of nature and give to the state the
responsibility of sustaining a system of redress of grievances. Preventing this kind
of result, in other words, can undergird the case for market-inalienability.
But going further, some defences of boilerplate rights deletions say that even
if consumers cannot be said to be actually doing anything—perhaps because they
60. The “savvy subset” conjecture has recently been investigated empirically in a likely market
(software) and found to be invalid there. See Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler &
David R Trossen, “Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard Form
Contracts” (2014) 43:1 J Leg Stud 1 at 2.
61. George A Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism” (1970) 84:3 Q J Econ 488.
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do not know anything about legal rights—we should nevertheless understand
them to be hypothetically consenting. Why? Presumably because that would
be efficient and therefore rational for the consumers—so it seems the argument
runs. It is hard to see how the proponent of such an argument would know
what might be efficient and rational, but perhaps easier to imagine for those
who are thinking of Econs, not Humans. But even if consumers could rightly
be held to have consented through such a hypothetical process, the question of
market-inalienability would still remain; that is, the question whether such consent
would be invalid because individuals cannot trade off these rights for money.
Finally, there is a defence in which consent or hypothetical consent just
drops out. In this version, it is efficient—so it is argued—for firms to delete
legal rights in return for the—allegedly—passed-on savings. In this version, there
is no agreement or pretense of agreement, so, as proponents of this argument
sometimes fail to realize, we are outside the realm of contract, or alleged contract.
In this scenario, even assuming that savings are really passed on, in just the right
amount, consumers’ property-rule entitlements are being massively condemned
by firms and turned into liability-rule entitlements under firms’ control.62
Worse, it might even be argued by those who accept the Kaldor-Hicks version of
efficiency,63 that the winners (the firms) would not have to compensate the losers
(the consumers) if the aggregate gain to the firms outweighed the aggregate loss
to the consumers. Under that argument, the firm can save money by forcing its
customers to waive their legal rights but not be expected to pass on the savings in
the form of lower prices.
To repeat: I do not argue that all boilerplate is wrong. Standardization in some
circumstances may be a desirable procedure, even an indispensable procedure.
I have not offered a fleshed-out treatment of what those circumstances might be.
Instead, my argument is directed toward trying to ask the right questions about
mass-market boilerplate as it is being deployed to cancel legal rights of redress.

62. A property rule entitlement is one according to which the holder has a right to choose
whether or not to sell, and at what price. A liability-rule entitlement is one that another
entity—a court or the government—can cancel if compensation is paid. Cf Calabresi &
Melamed, “Property Rules, Liability Rules,” supra note 10.
63. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is named for Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks, who theorized that
a new resource allocation would be more efficient than the original resource allocation if
those who are winners (better off) could hypothetically compensate the losers (worse off),
even if the compensation does not take place. See Nicholas Kaldor, “Welfare Propositions
in Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility” (1939) 49:195 Econ J 549; John
Hicks, “The Foundations of Welfare Economics” (1939) 49:196 Econ J 696.
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These questions led to one species of market-inalienability, thus one take on the
limits of propertization and contractualization.

IV. THE RULE OF LAW AND MASS-MARKET RIGHTS
DELETIONS
Finally, I come briefly to the effect of mass-market boilerplate rights deletions on
the Rule of Law. Here consideration of the Rule of Law intertwines with the issue
of market-inalienability. The Rule of Law is a contested concept, and I shall not
here attempt to lay out and examine various versions of its precepts. I sometimes
boil down the major precepts as follows: A state can be described as holding to the
Rule of Law if at minimum it has laws (1) whose commands are knowable and
(2) doable by human beings, (3) whose results are beneficial to human beings,
and (4) whose implementation abides by equality before the law. Some writers
on the Rule of Law include in its precepts more specific constitutional provisions
of western democracies.64
Whatever the full panoply of principles and precepts we think the Rule
of Law contains, it must be true that we should understand humans and their
administrative machinery to commit errors from time to time. Thus, it must be
true that rights affirmed and protected by the state must have remedies available
to subjects in case the rights are transgressed. In my view, this means, among
other things, that the background rules of the institutions of property and
contract—including the limits of property and contract, and including remedies
in property, tort, and contract law—must be maintained and properly enforced
by government. That is, the rules of the background legal infrastructure must
remain substantially within the care of the polity. The background rules may
be changed by democratic action, and we expect them to evolve over time. But
powerful firms should not be able to change the rules of the background legal
infrastructure of the polity whenever they wish by a simple expedient such as
deployment of boilerplate.
Earlier in my research I approached market-inalienability from the
perspective of property, and here, as I did later in my research, I approach it from
the perspective of contract. The boilerplate delivered to a consumer presumably
could not say, for example, “this contract is only enforceable by the firm, not by
the recipient.” At least it should not say that, and if it does say that, it should not
64. In an article published in 1989, I divided conceptions of the Rule of Law into roughly two
main strands, instrumental and substantive, each with sub-strands. Margaret Jane Radin,
“Reconsidering the Rule of Law” (1989) 69:4 BUL Rev 781.
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be enforceable. It should not be enforceable because it would alter the background
structure of contract in which parties are equally able to enforce contracts. Yet by
saying that the firm may modify the “contract” however and whenever it wants,
or that recipients’ only remedy is arbitration (before arbitrators chosen by the
firm and indebted to the firm for their jobs), or that recipients’ only remedy is
in a faraway place or sooner than the statute of limitations would have allowed,
the firms are effectively engaging in privatization of the legal infrastructure of
contracts. All of these privatization strategies are now occurring in the US on
a widespread basis. By undermining the feasibility of remedy, firms that deploy
boilerplate rights deletions are not just engaged in privatization, they are actually
undermining the infrastructure that makes private law function. They may
ultimately undermine their own ability to rely on contracts, not just the ability
of their customers to do so.
Which rights are crucial to maintaining the infrastructure that makes private
law function? How can we determine which rights should be permanently in the
care of the polity? To say the least, the questions invite debate. But the questions
will place debate where it ought to be. We should be arguing about which rights
must remain in the care of the polity rather than being subject to mass-market
waiver. Such argument should take primacy over continually arguing about
whether clicking “I agree” without reading the fine print does or does not amount
to consent, and thereby is or is not a binding contract. In other words, there is an
important prior question: There must be some rights that cannot be waived by
individuals on a massive basis, even if consent is present.65
Even Econs probably would recognize that rules to solve a collective action
problem must remain in the care of the polity.66 For Humans I suggest that in
addition the following characteristics may help identify some rights that must
remain in the care of the polity and not be subject to mass-market waiver by
individuals: (1) the rights are important to collective well-being, or indeed are

65. In this respect I agree with Michael Sandel: even with full consent of both parties, there
are some trades that should be disallowed. See Part II(B)(2), above, for further discussion.
Sandel did not focus on democratic degradation, however, and I believe trades resulting in
democratic degradation are an important category of trades that should be disallowed in a
polity that adheres to the Rule of Law.
66. Margaret Jane Radin, “The Fiduciary State and Private Ordering,” in Paul B Miller &
Andrew S Gold, eds, Contract, Status, and Fiduciary Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2017) 315.
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constitutive of civil society; (2) the purported waiver is widespread; and (3) the
rights are not salient for individuals.67
What rights are important to collective well-being or constitutive of civil
society? Without attempting to address this question in general, I think we
can begin by saying that at least some necessary background rights relate to
preservation of civil society itself. That is, some necessary background rights must
exist in order to avoid lapsing into a condition akin to the state of nature—at
least as regards those whose rights are deleted.68 Necessary background rights
include rights to be free from harm to one’s person or property, or indeed to one’s
basic freedom of action, either caused by the state or caused through the intent
or fault of others.69
Of particular concern with regard to threatening these necessary background
rights is the gathering trend in the US that allows boilerplate to waive liability
for harm caused by negligence. A typical clause of this kind, which a parent
was asked to sign in order for a child to attend a birthday party at a children’s
recreational facility, reads as follows:
The undersigned agrees to defend, indemnify, and hold harmless [this facility], its
officers, managers, members, employees, servants, agents and coaches/instructors
and their successors and assigns from and against all legal liability, claims, suits,
damages, losses, and expenses, including attorneys’ fees, threatened or incurred, and
arising from the child’s participation, or from any cause whatsoever.

Unless a society adopts some other method of compensation and deterrence,
it is important not to allow the basic right to be free of injury from others’
negligence to degenerate into a default rule routinely cancelled by boilerplate.
Unfortunately, this concern is not merely theoretical, as a number of states in the
US are now holding that people can waive their right to remedy for negligently
inflicted harm.70 Some are holding that people can waive the rights of their
67. See Radin, Boilerplate, supra note 4 at 37-40; Radin, “A Threat to the Rule of Law,” supra
note 30; Margaret Jane Radin, “Access to Justice and Abuses of Contract” (2016) 33:2
Windsor YB Access Just 177.
68. I think of this condition as quasi-anarchy; that is, a state of nature for the boilerplate
recipient but not for the firm that imposes it. See Radin, “A Threat to the Rule of
Law,” supra note 30.
69. Of course, in situations of actual agreements between parties equal in negotiating power,
one party may take on liability, and take upon itself the task of purchasing insurance (or that
party might choose to self-insure). But this is not the reasoning applicable to mass-market
boilerplate deployed against consumers. There is a serious problem in theory-to-world “fit”
here with mass-market boilerplate rights deletion, but not with agreements between parties
of equal negotiating power.
70. See e.g. Hall v Sinclair Refining Co, 242 NC 707, 709, 89 SE2d 396, 397 (1955).
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children, as well.71 Remedies for injuries caused by gross negligence, recklessness,
and intentional harm should a fortiori not be waivable. So far courts have not
gone beyond enforcing exculpation for a firm’s own negligence. Many of the
clauses in use pretend to waive everything (“from any cause whatsoever”). Perhaps
they deter suits by recipients among the small minority that reads them—though
activism on behalf of consumers may succeed in making consumers aware of
these clauses and their effect without having to read them. More significant,
perhaps they deter those non-readers who consult a lawyer, because the lawyer
will inform such a client that there is at least serious trouble to be overcome
because of the exculpatory clause.
Now that we (or at least most of us) understand that Humans are not Econs,
that Humans are not rational in the sense imagined by old-school Chicago
economics, the problem of heuristic bias on the part of Human recipients must
be considered. In particular, rights-deletion clauses tend not to be salient to an
individual before he or she needs to exercise the rights. An individual about to
click “I agree” does not readily consider whether he or she will ever need any
redress of grievances. Individuals do not consider whether they might need to be
part of a class action lawsuit against a firm with whom they are dealing. They are
likely to think that serious harms happen to other people. And indeed, serious
harms most often do befall others—though into each life some rain must fall.
Serious harms caused by firms we deal with do happen to some unlucky people
some of the time, and that is one reason why the rights dealing with redress are
needed for all of us. Our rights of redress are not salient to us before we need
them. Our inability to protect such rights against cancellation before we need
them explains why they must be considered to be permanently in the care of the
polity; hence market-inalienable. That is, the fact that rights that undergird civil
society as a whole are usually not salient to individuals underscores the point that
such rights, though couched as attaching to individuals, should not be waivable
by individuals.72
At a certain point, when we have millions of people without effective redress
of grievances, we are not a society that observes the Rule of Law. Moreover, we are
71. See Colo Rev Stat § 13-22-107 (2012); Kelly v United States, 809 F Supp 2d 429 (EDNC
2011); BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc v Rosen, 80 A.3d 345 (Md 2013).
72. At least, not by means of mass-market boilerplate. Whether or not boilerplate is deployed
in a mass-market way seems significant at least when considering the Rule of Law, because
the Rule of Law is a guide to practice in keeping with certain ideals; it is not a theoretical
zero-sum game. An isolated single instance of wrongful waiver, though wrongful, would
not necessarily undermine the Rule of Law because “fit” with an ideal of justice need
not be perfect.
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not observing equality before the law when one segment of society still possesses
important rights that the other segment has lost. Rights important to the Rule of
Law should not be cancellable by mass-market boilerplate, but should remain in
the care of the polity; that is, these rights should be market-inalienable. Further
thought and debate is needed, about which rights these are, and when (under
what circumstances) they must be non-waivable. For now I have considered that
at least mass-market waivers of basic constitutional and remedial rights by means
of boilerplate should be disallowed.

V. CONCLUSION
In a sense, this article is a memoir. I have taken the opportunity, generously offered
by the Osgoode Hall Law & Markets Symposium: Regulating Controversial
Exchange, to review and reconsider some of my research in property theory and
contract theory. One primary aim of my research—in the context of how theories
of property or contract are (or are not) coherent with moral commitments and
with legal and social practice—was to provide pathways for understanding the
significance of market-inalienability. Market-inalienability is a procedure for
maintaining rights that should be permanently in the care of the polity.
Much has changed in the time since I began writing about market-inalienability
in the latter 1980s. At that time, it was unusual (and perhaps unheard of ) to talk
about commodification in a law review article, or in legal scholarship generally
(the editors at Harvard University Press would not accept Commodification as the
title of my 1996 book, and called it Contested Commodities instead). Today it is
as acceptable to talk about and study commodification as any other subject of
legal and social theory and practice, and, as demonstrated by the Symposium of
which this memoir is a part, there are many scholars observing and writing about
controversial markets, from many points of view. Commodification has not gone
unnoticed, at least.
Perhaps that is an indication that markets involving trade in significant
human capacities and indicia of personhood can co-exist with an understanding
that such capacities and indicia ought not to be fully salable. Yet, it does seem
that commodification of essential human attributes has been on the rise. Today
controversial markets are international in scope, and the injustice involved in
blaming sellers in poor countries for selling their body parts or their children to
buyers from rich countries has not gone away. At the same time, however, today
there are more writers who defend sellers without signing on to the thoroughgoing
commitment to fungibility of value and market rhetoric characteristic of old
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school Chicago law and economics. Some readers of my memoir may think that
the questions that bothered me in the mid-90s are resolved: we can all be part
Human and part Econ. Others may think that commodification has proceeded
apace and there is no going back to a less commodified time. For me the dilemmas
I struggled with in my research remain.
Meanwhile, at least in developed countries, we have become more and more
members of an information society. Many of the changes that have already taken
place and are now taking place, such as replacement of human workers with
robots, and replacement of state supervision of contracts with “self-enforcing
algorithmic contracts” were not well predicted three decades ago (at least not by
law professors). It remains to be seen what the maturing of the information society
will ultimately mean for human personhood and for economics, psychology,
and sociology. There is no doubt that the information society can have many
beneficial effects, and in any case seems here to stay.
In the present day, which is perhaps a transition period, we are seeing a
great many efforts to turn toward computer-implemented transactions, such
as “self-enforcing algorithmic contracts,” and away from transactions that are
actually subject to the law of contracts. In my recent work on boilerplate I
have touched the tip of the iceberg here, by noting that shifting of entitlements
between parties by machines, which I call “machine rule,” goes against the Rule
of Law because it cuts out the backdrop of the state’s supervision of contracts,
the infrastructure of legality.73 Will the state in the information society be willing
and able to reestablish its control of the background infrastructure of legality?
Or will the privatization of rights and the control by profit-maximizing firms that
worried me with mass-market boilerplate be brought to fruition with machine
rule? I do not have a prediction to offer. I can only hope that scholars will continue
to explore and understand the importance of legal infrastructure and the role of
the polity in undergirding and enforcing the Rule of Law.

73. Radin, “Deformation of Contract,” supra note 39.

